Drawing on research that views partisan attachments as driven by social identities, I argue the gender gap is a function of men and women changing their partisanship as they seek the best representation of their gendered social identity from the political parties. Specifically, changes in the parties due to party realignments and shifts in the composition of their congressional delegations have provided individuals with a clearer signal on which to base their partisan attachments. Men and women have responded differently to these signals and developed different political identities over the past 70 years, resulting in the gender gap in partisanship. To test this theory, I have constructed an innovative macro-level dataset of men's and women's partisan attachments on a quarterly basis between 1950 and 2012. I use a Seemingly Unrelated Regression framework to estimate patterns of men's and women's Democratic macropartisanship and whether particular factors contribute to the gender gap by having different effects on men's and women's partisanship. The results are consistent with my theoretical expectations, highlight how symbolic images shape partisan attachments, and demonstrate the gender gap is a function of changes in both men's and women's macropartisanship.
The gender gap first garnered publicity in the aftermath of the 1980 presidential election.
In addition to the gender gap in vote choice, differences between men and women have been identified in opinions, ideology, knowledge, and partisanship (Wirls 1986 , Huddy et al. 2008 , Ondercin & Jones-White 2011 . Initially heralded as a success of the second wave of the women's movement, these gender gaps were largely attributed to changes in women's political behavior (Abzug 1984 , Smeal 1984 . Further analyses, however, suggest the gender gap may be less about women's behavior than it is about men's behavior (Wirls 1986 , Kaufmann & Petrocik 1999 , Norrander 1999 . Despite a robust body of scholarship on the gender gap, we do not have a clear understanding of the origins of the gender gap in partisanship, or whether the gap is a function of men leaving the Democratic Party or women growing more Democratic.
This manuscript addresses these shortcomings by analyzing the dynamics of men's and women's partisanship separately from 1950 to 2012. Drawing on research that views partisan attachments as driven by social identities , I argue the gender gap is a function of men and women changing their partisanship as they seek the best representation of their gendered social identity from the political parties. Specifically, changes in the parties, due to party realignments and shifts in the composition of the their congressional delegations, have provided individuals with a clearer signal on which to base their partisan attachments. Men and women have responded differently to these signals and developed different political identities over the past 70 years, resulting in the gender gap in partisanship.
This manuscript makes four contributions. First, it furthers our understanding of macro political behavior through examining the political dynamics of subgroups in the electorate.
Political identities, such as sex, divide and structure the electorate. Moreover, these divisions have important political implications for electoral politics (Diekman & Schneider 2010 , Schaffner 2005 . By understanding how sex structures partisan attachments over time we gain insight into electoral changes. Second, this paper provides a more complete theoretical explanation of the gender gap. While occasionally acknowledging that men's behavior may form the gap, existing research largely has theorized about the gap from the perspective of women's political behavior. The theory proposed here accounts for changes in both men's and women's political behavior and the political parties. Third, the data used in this analysis allows for a better empirical understanding of the gender gap. I have constructed an innovative macro-level dataset of men's and women's partisan attachments on a quarterly basis between 1950 and 2012. Having data on men's and women's partisanship at this level of aggregation is crucial to understanding the gender gap, because, at a fundamental level, the gender gap is a macro phenomenon. Finally, most studies of the gender gap focus on the period after 1980, overlooking earlier movement in men's and women's partisanship.
Analyzing men's and women's macropartisanship over time allows us to better understand movements in partisanship that are not election specific and provides a clearer picture of the origins of the gender gap than analyzing the gap in vote choice. Because party realignments and changes in the aggregate affiliations of the electorate are slow to evolve (Brewer & Stonecash 2009 , Petrocik 1981 , the 62 years of data analyzed here provide unique leverage for understanding the long-term dynamics of men's and women's partisanship.
The Gender Gap
Differences between men's and women's partisan attachments and vote choice play a critical role in shaping presidential, gubernatorial, Senate, and House elections (Carroll 2006) .
Combined with women's higher likelihood to turnout to vote, small shifts in the gender gap are magnified in election returns (Diekman & Schneider 2010) . Despite decades of research on the gender gap, we have a limited understanding of what drives differences in men's and women's political behavior for four reasons.
First, the vast majority of research on the gender gap tends to be election-centric. That is, most analyses are done post-election and explain the gender gap in vote choice as a function of the salient issues and the characteristics of the voters in particular elections. With respect to the role of issues, men and women have held different opinions for decades concerning the use of force domestically and abroad, social welfare, the environment, and the size and scope of government (Lizotte 2016 , Cassese & Barnes 2016 , Huddy et al. 2008 ). These differences are stable and robust across electoral contexts and have been linked to the gender gap in vote choice (Chaney, Alvarez & Nagler 1998) . In addition to issue positions, the salience of the issues also appears to matter. For example, while simple differences on social welfare issues appear to explain the gender gap in 1992, it is the salience of social welfare issues to male voters that matters in 1996 (Kaufmann & Petrocik 1999) .
Electorates' demographic characteristics also are commonly used to explain the study of the gender gap in vote choice. Carroll's (1988) classic thesis argues the gender gap is a function of women's growing economic and psychological independence from men as a result of increased workforce participation. Women's participation in the paid labor force increases their tendency to vote for Democratic presidential candidates (Manza & Brooks 1998) . Moreover, differences in the issue positions discussed above largely have been attributed to women's role in society and increased autonomy (Howell & Day 2000 , Diekman & Schneider 2010 .
These studies are informative, but their focus on elections has limited our understanding of the origins and dynamics of the gender gap in two ways. One, analyses of vote choice identify issue differences as a central explanatory factor of the gender gap, but the differences in men's and women's opinions across issues have remained relatively stable (Kellstedt, Peterson & Ramirez 2010) . Accordingly, the focus on issues fails to help us understand why the gap has grown over time. Two, election outcomes do not simply materialize; rather they are products of dynamics occurring between elections . Studies of vote choice offer only a limited examination of the sources of the gender gap in partisanship. Yet, partisan attachments fundamentally shape the voting decisions of the electorate (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008 ) and the gender gap in vote choice (Kaufmann & Petrocik 1999 ). An additional by-product of the election-centric nature of gender gap studies has been the focus on post-1980 elections. This overlooks the fact that gender gaps existed before the 1980 presidential election (Norrander 2008) . We therefore need to examine men's and women's partisan attachments and expand the temporal scope of our research to understand the origins of the gender gap.
A second limiting factor of existing research is its level of analysis. The gender gap is an aggregate phenomena. The vast majority of research that seeks to understand what factors cause the gender gap, though, is focused on the individual (for exceptions, see BoxSteffensmeier, De Boef & Lin 2004 , Norrander 1999 . Important individual-level processes contribute to the gender gap (Diekman & Schneider 2010) ; however, how dynamics at the aggregate-level shape these individual-level processes is poorly understood.
Third, and somewhat paradoxically, analyses of the gender gap itself limits our ability to identify the source of the gap. The gender gap is a function of both men's and women's political behavior. Indeed, the gender gap could emerge and/or grow due to any of the following processes, in isolation or combination. First, men's partisanship could change while women's partisanship remains the same. Second, women's partisanship could change and men's partisanship could stay the same. Third, both men's and women's partisanship could change in the same direction but with different magnitudes. Fourth, men's and women's partisanship could change in opposite directions. Therefore, analyzing men's and women's aggregate partisanship separately is necessary to identify and understand the processes underlying the gender gap.
Finally, there is limited theoretical discussion of the role the political parties play in the formation and maintenance of the gender gap. Initial reports of the gender gap suggested the gap was a function of changes occurring within the parties (Abzug 1984 , Smeal 1984 , but subsequent studies found little support for this claim (Mansbridge 1985) . Norrander (1999) suggests Southern realignment may contribute to the growth of the gender gap; however, her analysis is limited to ocular examination of trends. Important changes have occurred within the parties in terms of policy positions and who makes up the parties-in-government (Wolbrecht 2000) . The lack of attention to the political parties suggests we are missing an important piece of the puzzle for understanding the origins of the gender gap.
The study closest to mine is Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef & Lin (2004) This paper addresses these shortcomings by offering a theoretical explanation of the gender gap that focuses on how both men and women adjust their partisan attachments in reaction to changes in the political parties. The implications of this theory are then tested on aggregate measures of men's and women's partisanship between 1950 and 2012, providing insight into both the origins of the gender gap and how it has changed over time.
Theorizing Change in Men's and Women's Partisanship
Gender shapes experiences, expectations, and interests 1 and, consequently, influences the U.S political system in a multitude of ways (Ritter 2008) . Further, men's and women's social identities are fundamentally linked to their sex 2 and form the basis of their partisan identification . This implies the gender gap's formation is at least partially a result of men and women adjusting their partisan preferences based on the representation of their gendered social identity in the political parties.
Sex, Representation, and Party Realignments
Individuals select the party that they perceive to best reflect and represent their salient social identities . Moreover, the electorate looks for cues from the political parties regarding representation (Levendusky 2009 ). I contend that changes in the parties as a result of party realignments and changes in the sex composition of their congressional delegations have produced clearer signals for voters in terms of the 1 Historical, economic, social, and political contexts have positioned women and men in distinct categories, suggesting that they will also have distinct interests (Beckwith 2014 , Sapiro 1981 ) Men, as a group, also should hold political preferences shaped by their societal position (Iversen & Rosenbluth 2010) . Importantly, analysis of how gender structures men's and women's behavior does not assume homogeneity among men or women as a social group.
Rather, gender is one of many social structures and identities individuals use to form partisan attachments.
2 Early explanations of the on the gender gap that focused on gender/feminist consciousness among women (Conover 1988 , Conover & Sapiro 1993 have two theoretical limitations in their ability to explain the gap. First, the gap has continued to grow despite a decline in mobilization. Second, these explanations do not address men's contribution the gap. The relationship between sex and the political parties has changed greatly over the past several decades. Party differences, as a result of issue evolutions, have emerged around abortion and other women's issues (Wolbrecht 2000 , Adams 1997 ), but the evidence is much weaker for a full realignment around gender (Sanbonmatsu 2002) . Intimately related, feminists found the Democratic Party more welcoming and anti-feminists found a home within the Republican Party (Freeman 1987 , Wolbrecht 2002 , Deckman 2016 . Existing scholarship largely focuses on the impact of a narrow range of "women's issues" and interests. While understandable, focusing only on these specific issues could overlook changes in parties based on issues not explicitly identified as women's issues.
Arguably the largest change between the political parties and sex concerns who is elected to represent the parties-in-government. The number of women in elected office has increased dramatically over the past several decades, but more so in the Democratic Party. In the Over time these social programs have become increasingly associated with minority interests (Gilens 1999 , Kinder 1996 . Accordingly, the perception of the Democratic Party changed slowly to one dominated by minority interests. Consistent with this claim, the connection between civil rights and women's rights has increased among delegates to party conventions (Wolbrecht 2002 ). While often not considered part of the New Deal coalition, 3 our perception of the Democratic Party has evolved to incorporate women and their interests. As the Democratic Party has incorporated a more heterogeneous mix of groups, men as a social group, and in particular white men, have found less of a connection with the Democratic Party. As a result, the winning coalition of the Republican Party contains more men (see Busch's (2005) analysis of the Reagan revolution). This explanation fits with the finding that men's attitudes about social welfare spending have become an increasingly important determinant of partisanship (Kaufmann 2002 , Kaufmann & Petrocik 1999 ).
The policies resulting from the New Deal are also relevant to women, but not in the same fashion as they are for men. Women tend to be more supportive of social welfare policies 3 However, Andersen's (1979) analysis of the realignment process in Chicago between 1928
and 1936 places women within the Democratic Party's coalition. Brewer & Stonecash (2009) also classify women as one of the social groups associated with the New Deal realignment.
than men (Huddy et al. 2008 , Cassese & Barnes 2016 While not new, Southern realignment continues to shape partisan politics. The solid Democratic majority found in the states of the Confederacy has vanished in both the mass electorate and elected officials (Black & Black 2002) . Additionally, the process of Southern realignment has been linked to the gender gap in partisanship and vote choice (Norrander , 1999 . Due to changes within the parties over issues of race, white men in the South fled the Democratic Party (Carmines & Stimson 1989) . Women in the South were slower to change their partisan attachments, creating a gender gap in partisanship (Norrander 1999 , Ondercin 2013 ). The process of Southern realignment should result in further declines in men's Democratic partisanship. Southern realignment's effect on women's partisanship is less clear because of the cross-cutting influences of regional identity and gender identity.
Not only did Southern realignment shift regional party attachments, but it further aligned the interests of the Democratic Party with those of minorities. This implies the effects of Southern realignment should not be limited to individuals in the South; rather, Southern realignment should act as a cue about the make-up and interests of the Democratic Party throughout the country.
Finally, political and economic evaluations explain changes in partisan attachments (Downs 1957 , Fiorina 1977 , especially at the macro-level . 4 Such evaluations influence short-term fluctuations and can have enduring effects on macropartisanship. It is unclear, though, exactly how economic and political evaluations contribute to the gender gap in partisanship. There is considerable evidence that men and women evaluate politics and the economy differently. Gender gaps in partisanship and vote choice extend to gender gaps in presidential approval (Wirls 1986 , Gilens 1988 . Men and women also tend to evaluate government performance on social welfare and military issues differently (Gilens 1988 , Fite, Genest & Wilcox 1990 ). Additionally, regardless of which party holds the White House, women tend to offer more negative evaluations of the economy, a driving force behind differences in presidential approval (Clarke et al. 2005) .
Measurement
Assessing men's and women's partisan attachments requires two dependent variables: Finally, I control for economic and political evaluations that could influence partisanship.
Economic evaluations are measured using the Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (Consumer Sentiment). This index is available quarterly beginning in 1952, with a few quarters missing early in the series. Any missing data were interpolated by using the average of the two time points before and after the missing observation. I multiplied the series by negative 1 during Republican presidential administrations to adjust for differing effects. 5 Political evaluations are modeled using presidential approval from Gallup surveys. The influence of the economy is purged from the approval measure by regressing consumer sentiment on the presidential approval series and using the residuals. The Approval series is also recoded based on presidential administrations and the first quarter of a new presidency is dropped to account for changes in presidential administrations.
Model Specification
The empirical analysis in this paper focuses on three questions. The tables in the manuscript present the effect of a one standard deviation change in the independent variable on men's and women's partisanship and the difference of the effects.
The full regression results can be found in the Appendix. Given that some variables contain multiple lags, reporting the effects allows us to efficiently assess the total influence a covariate has on the partisan attachments of men and women.
The bivariate results reported in Table 1 During the full time period (Table 2 Panel The results concerning the sex composition of the congressional delegations suggest initial accounts of the gender gap as a product of the 2 nd wave of the women's movement may have been on to something. In the wake of the failure to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment and in response to the lack of action within the political parties, many 2 nd wave social movement organizations started programs to increase women's representation in government (Pimlott 2010 , Barasko 2004 . Initially, these efforts were non-partisan or bipartisan.
However, changes in the relationships between feminism, social conservatism, and the political parties changed the political opportunity structure (Freeman 1986 , Wolbrecht 2000 .
These transformations resulted in the women's movement disproportionately influencing the election of Democratic women compared to Republican women. Thus, by changing the composition of the party elite, the women's movement indirectly contributed to the formation and growth of the gender gap in partisanship.
There are mixed results concerning the influence of the New Deal and women's workforce participation. In the bivariate models these factors showed a significant relationship between either men's or women's partisanship and some contribution to the gender gap. However, in the fully specified models these relationships fall below traditional levels of significance.
Given the difficulty of analyzing slow-moving, long-term trends, these factors likely play some role in shifting men away from and moving women towards the Democratic Party.
While this paper is largely about differences between men's and women's partisan attachments, the similarity in men's and women's partisanship is notable. A considerable degree of the movement in men's and women's Democratic macropartisanship is shared. As many earlier studies have found, economic and political evaluations contribute to changes in party identification. This analysis shows that men and women generally have similar reactions to changes in economic and political evaluations. However, there is some evidence that suggests these relationships might vary across subgroups in the electorate. Further research is needed to help understand how sex conditions political and economic evaluations and how these different reactions may contribute to the gender gap.
The analysis and theory presented here highlight the importance of gender as a social identity that structures men's and women's political behavior. Moreover, the dynamic and persistent nature of changes in men's and women's behavior suggest gender will continue to be an important feature of electoral politics. Focusing on gender as a politically relevant social identity does not mean that it is the only relevant social identity. Rather, gender intersects with many other social identities, such as race and class, that also structure the political attitudes and behavior of the electorate. Some scholars have criticized the use of Gallup surveys because the partisanship question is different from the question used by other survey houses (Converse 1976 , Abramson & Ostrom Jr 1991 . Gallup asks "In politics today, do you considers yourself a Republican, Democrat, or Republican." They argue the phrase "In politics today" results in greater short-term variation than questions that use the phrase "Generally speaking." While there is evidence that the Gallup series do exhibit greater variation, this variation does not appear to greatly influence substantive results , MacKuen, Erikson & Stimson 1992 , Bishop et al. 1994 . Unfortunately, other surveys do not offer the rich time series that can be compiled from the Gallup surveys.
One potential obstacle with basing the time series on Gallup surveys is that Gallup changed their mode of interview from in-person to telephone. Many have observed that the telephone interviews produced samples that tended to be more Republican , Hugick 1991 Approval : Reflects the percent approving of the president. The influence of the economy is purged from the approval measure by regressing an non-transformed consumer sentiment on the presidential approval series and using the residuals. The residuals were then multiplied by negative 1 during Republican presidential administrations.
B Results
This section contains the regression results that were used to calculate the effects reported in the manuscript. Tables A-2 -A-4 correspond to Table 1 in the manuscript. Tables A-5 -A-7 correspond to Table 2 in the manuscript. I start with the bivaraite specification for each variable allowing for contemporaneous effects and up to 8 lags. Insignificant lags were dropped one at a time, balancing model parsimony, the Akaike information criteria (AIC), and the Bayesian information criteria (BIC) to determine the preferred lag specification.
Among these criteria, model parsimony was privileged, but alternative specifications were checked to ensure the robustness of the reported results. To specify the multivariate analysis, I started with the preferred by bivariate lag-length specification. I then tested alternative model specifications by dropping insignificant lags, once again balancing AIC, BIC, and model parsimony. 
